While the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom have largely lifted broad economic sanctions on Syria following the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, the key sanctions still hindering the new government’s counternarcotics strategy are targeted sanctions on specific individuals/entities involved in the Captagon trade, the general “chilling effect” on the financial sector, and existing counterterrorism designations. 

Hindering Sanctions and Factors

• Targeted Sanctions on Traffickers: Sanctions have been removed from the Syrian state generally, but strict sanctions remain specifically on individuals and entities known to be involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon. This is intended to be a tool against the drug trade, but it can complicate broader economic reintegration efforts necessary for a stable government to effectively police its territory.
• “Chilling Effect” on the Financial Sector:Decades of comprehensive sanctions have created a significant “chilling effect,” leading international financial institutions to be extremely cautious, or refuse altogether, to process transactions involving Syria, even when legal exemptions exist. This makes it difficult for the new government to:
  • Access International Funds: Struggle to receive international aid or investment needed to rebuild infrastructure, strengthen law enforcement capacity, and fund alternative livelihoods, all of which are crucial for a successful counternarcotics strategy.
  • Engage in International Commerce: The difficulty in using normal banking channels impedes trade, slows down the general economic recovery, and inadvertently drives some economic activity underground, where illicit trades like Captagon thrive.
• Counterterrorism Designations: The leader of the interim government, Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Mohammed al-Jolani), was previously designated as a terrorist by the UN and the US due to his leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that led the offensive against Assad.
  • While the US and UN Security Council recently lifted these specific terror-related sanctions on al-Sharaa to engage with the new government, some stringent restrictions and export controls related to security purposes still remain.
  • These past designations can still influence policy decisions and create legal complexities for some international partners considering direct material support (like training or equipment) for the new Syrian security forces in their fight against drug networks.
• Export Control Restrictions: General restrictions on exporting certain goods and technology to Syria, particularly those that might have dual military/security use, can limit the new government’s ability to acquire necessary equipment for border security, surveillance, and law enforcement operations against sophisticated smuggling networks. 

In summary, the new Syrian government’s counternarcotics strategy is less hindered by overt, comprehensive sanctions (which have mostly been lifted) and more by the practical difficulties of re-entering the global financial system and rebuilding a functional state apparatus under the shadow of past sanctions regimes and existing targeted restrictions. 

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the new Syrian authorities have taken a public and active stance against the Captagon trade, implementing a series of high-profile actions:

• Dismantling Major Production Facilities: The interim government announced the closure and dismantling of state-backed, industrial-scale facilities and dozens of labs, many of which were linked to the former regime’s elite Fourth Armored Division and individuals associated with the Assad family.
• Massive Seizures of Pills and Precursors:Authorities have conducted numerous large-scale interdictions. In the months following the regime’s collapse, over 200 million Captagon pills were seized from various production sites and warehouses, an amount significantly higher than seizures during the entire Assad era. This includes a four million-pill shipment at the port of Latakia and 500 kg of precursor chemicals found outside Damascus.
• Public Destruction of Seized Drugs: The government has made a point of publicly burning large quantities of seized Captagon pills near Damascus to demonstrate its commitment to eradication and distance itself from the former “narco-state” image.
• Increased Cross-Border Cooperation: The new authorities have improved intelligence sharing and coordinated with neighboring countries, including Turkey and Jordan. A joint committee was formed with Jordan to combat smuggling along the shared border.
• Arrests and Targeting of Trafficking Networks:The Syrian Interior Ministry has expanded its intelligence collection and launched arrests of prominent figures involved in the drug trade during the former regime, both inside and outside Syrian territory. 

Despite these efforts, challenges remain. The trade has become more fragmented, with smaller, mobile labs emerging in less controlled southern regions of Syria. Additionally, some prominent “narco-kingpins” in southern border areas have reportedly remained untouched due to the new government’s need to maintain stability and avoid conflict with powerful local clans. 

The “war on drugs” in the Middle East is primarily a major regional effort to combat the massive production and trafficking of 

Captagon, an illegal amphetamine, with Syria identified as the epicenter of its production under the former Assad regime. 

Key Aspects of the Middle East War on Drugs

• Primary Drug: Captagon is the central focus due to its high addictiveness, low production cost, and huge profitability, with the trade estimated to be worth billions of dollars annually (one estimate placed the 2023 international trade value at $57 billion). It is widely used for recreational purposes, by students, and by militia fighters who use it to increase stamina and suppress hunger.
• Source and Destination: Syria, particularly under the Assad regime and linked to its military forces and Hezbollah, became the main source country, functioning as a “narco-state” to generate revenue amid sanctions and civil war. The primary destination markets are the wealthy Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• Transit Countries: Jordan and Iraq serve as major transit countries, experiencing their own rising domestic use and associated violence and corruption linked to the trade.
• Enforcement Efforts:
  • Jordan has launched a direct “narco-war” on its border with Syria, involving deadly shoot-outs with smugglers and even airstrikes on drug warehouses in Syria.
  • Saudi Arabia and the UAE implement strict domestic laws, including the death penalty for trafficking, and have made massive seizures of pills in ports and at border crossings.
  • Regional Cooperation: Arab states have attempted diplomatic solutions, such as readmitting Syria to the Arab League in 2023 on the condition it would curb the drug flows, though there is little evidence this has been effective.
• Challenges: The trade is difficult to stop due to the involvement of powerful militant groups and state-linked actors (like Iran-linked militias and the former Syrian regime’s powerful Fourth Division), widespread corruption, political instability, and established smuggling routes. The recent fall of the Assad regime has led the new Syrianauthorities to launch their own war on drugs in an effort to dismantle the empire that flourished under the previous rule. 

Beyond Captagon, the region also faces issues with methamphetamine production and trafficking (linked to the ephedra plant in Afghanistan and Iran) and opioid use, especially in Iran which seizes more heroin and opium than any other country globally.